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DISCOVERY IN THE CONTEXT OF APPLICATION: TECHNOLOGICAL AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL ISSCIES IN THE CASE OF HYPERSONIC AIRCRAFT 
Dominique Foray (CNRS, IRIS TS, and IIASA) and 
Emmanuelle Conesa (ECT, Universitt LumiCre, Lyon 2) 
Some research programs, although often oriented towards scientific questions 
that are well beyond the frontiers of knowledge, include a phase of production dealing 
with technical tools, research instruments and data, that may be very "rich in 
innovations". This phase of acquisition of certain technical, and in some sense applied 
knowledge may precede basic and ayplied research. We will call the innovation process 
embodied in this particular phase "discovery in the context of application" [I.]. A good 
example of this is the search for a viable hypersonic aircraft now being undertaken by 
many nations. The purpose of this paper is to describe such a research program, to show 
how concretely a process of discovery by application is organized, and to explore some 
of the s9ecific economic and organizational issues raised by this particular process [2]. 
The US National Aerospace Plane program (NASP) will be used as an example, and we 
will concentrate on the organizational form of the program. We will deal with the 
problem of finding a balance between two organizational priorities: on the one hand, the 
necessity to design an organizational system involving multiple decentralized projects, 
in order to facilitate experiments in different directions and to decrease the risk of 
missing the best design; on the other hand, the necessity of "clubbing together" and 
formin:* a s:ngle entity. in order to produce the technalogies required to do the 
research; the so-called "instrumentalities and infratechnologies", which possess a strong 
public good aspect. 
Economic analysis has enabled us to establish a certain number of rigorous 
propositions, in the area of resource allocation in basic research (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 
1959; Dasgupta and David, 1986), as well as with respect to the economic returns of this 
activity (Hirshleifer, 1971; David, Mowery and Steinrnueller, 1992; Pavitt, 1992) or even 
with respect to the integration of the research activity into the innovation process 
(Freeman, 1982; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989; Foray and Mowery, 1990; Kline and 
Rosenberg, .- 1956; Aoki, 1984; Rosenberg, 1990). Nonetheless, the analytical framework 
so far developed does not yet allow us to study the organizational design for research 
programs involving processes of discovery in the context of application [3]. 
1 )  - NASP Organization: the diversity-standardization dilemma 
The purpose of the NASP program is to develop and demonstrate hypersonic and 
trans-atmospheric SSTO (sicgle-stage-to-orbit) technologies that will support future 
national security and commercial applications and provide economies in space-launch 
costs. The NASP program is currently in Phase I1 of a three-phase research, 
developnient. test, and evaluation (RDT&E) program. Phase I1 is a multiyear 
techiiology demonstration effort with the goal of showing that the NASP technologies - 
including air-breathing propulsion, advanced aerodynamics, materials and structures, 
fuel systems. avionics. and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) - can achieve maturity 
adequate to support a Phase 111 effort that includes development, fabrication, and flight 
testing of an experimental flight vehicle called X-30 (Augenstein and Harris, 1993). 
1 - 1 )  The technological target 
Scientists have long contemplated the construction of an aircraft capable of 
attaining satellite speeds. having take- off like a regular airplane, and returning to earth 
once its mission is accomplished. Space station re-supply would be much cheaper than 
with systems requiring launching of rockets that cannot be recovered or reused. An 
aerospace transport vessel, in contrast, could be flown repeatedly. The same project 
should also eventually lead, with certain adjustements, to the production of a hypersonic 
trmsport vessel capable of travelling between two spots on the earth at Mach 8. 
According to the IIASA' scenario of future air transport (Nakinenovic, 1987 and 1988, 
Gruebler, 1990, Gruebler, Nakinenovic and Schifer, 1993), the performance of 
transport aircraft is estimated to saturate at about 1.2 million passenger-kilometers per 
hour which is reachable with current aircraft technology and some improvements. 
However. thereafter aircraft would be required to exceed these levels implying either 
large subsoriic liners (capable of transporting a few thousand passengers) or hypersonic 
transport with a more modest capacity of a few hundred passengers. Using the 
quantitative analysis of the historical performance improvement of civil aircraft engine, 
Gruebler, Nakinenovic and Schifer (1993) argued that the first alternative appears 
unlikely since it would require very powerful engines and their rating appears to be 
saturating in unison with aircraft performance. The second alternative appears more 
plausible: a new engine could power a hypersonic aircraft of the next century with a 
performance of a few thousand passenger-kilometers per hour. 
The ultimate success of this project depends, therefore, on solving the problem of 
propulsion generated by aerobic motors [4]. Aerobic propulsion technology has 
sisnificant advantages, notably: 
- An improvement in mass ratio of the order of 3 to 5 in comparison with the 
mass placed into orbit by anaerobic propulsion. This is because aerobic 
motors utilize air as a combustive agent, obviating the need for the oxygen 
mass loaded for combustion in rockets. 
- The possibility of reutilization thus eliminating costly replacement (or in the 
bcrst case - as in the case of the shuttle - re-configuring and re-qualifying after 
tach tlisht). 
- The abili~y to take off and land horizontally as well as the elimination of 
auxiliary solid-fuel rockets and other types of launch support. 
- Maintenance is closer to airplane maintenance than rocket maintenance. 
However, at the sought-after flight speeds (beyond Mach 6) supersonic 
combustion becomes necessary [ 5 ] ,  requiring the difficult merger of the aerobic 
principle and hypersonic speeds in the perfectioning of a supersonic ramjet (otherwise 
called a "scramjet"). This demands a change in the technological paradigm. 
Five countries have launched projects in this direction: the USA (NASP), France 
(PREPHA), the UK (HOTOL, currently in abeyance), Germany (Singer), and Japan 
(HOPE). The former USSR also possesses significant scientific and technological 
capabilities in this areas, but current information on those programs is lacking. Note that 
the French and Russians are now negotiating an expansion in their joint efforts into 
more hypersonic technology areas. 
The weight of technological inheritance requires that we distinguish among 
countries according to the history of their research efforts in aerobic propulsion. On the 
one side, the USA, France and the UK have pursued military research programs on 
aerobic propulsion for missiles at supersonic speeds. These countries therefore have 
infratechnologies emerging from the old paradigm (the ramjet). Military research 
permitted the maintenance of a research direction abandoned by the civil sector in favor 
of rocket propulsion (Berton, 1991). On the other side, Germany and Japan do not have 
the scientific and technological bases of the preceding paradigm. 
1-2) The NASP organization: a topic of debate 
Cohen, Edelmann. and No11 (1991) described the NASP organization as being 
similar to the great Japanese government-industry collaborations. NASP was extracted 
from tt-;e American industrial-government fabric, a new entity which incorporated 
private and public expertise previously isolated and dispersed throughout the system. 
The objective of this new entity was to share all technical results and to formulate a 
single design incorporating features of each firm's past work (Cohen, Edelman, and 
Noll, 1991, p.51) [6]. 
Also notable is the desire to rapidly render the new entity irreversible by 
producing specific codes and specific informational channels. Thus an electronic 
communication team was immediately created with the objective of developing networks 
within the contracting system [7]. This prioritization brings to mind Arrow's ideas (1974) 
that codes and information channels are forms of irreversible organizational capital. 
Thus, the rapid creation of codes and informational channels within the emerging entity, 
composed of subgroups of independent firms, imposes an irreversible character upon 
organizational investments. 
A third organizational characteristic is noteworthy: the unprecedented level of 
integration of public laboratories in the research project. For the laboratories, this 
intezration process (known as "mainlining") involves going beyond generic tasks to 
include research and experimentation instruments [8]. 
According to Cohen et al., NASP's organizational form (classified as an 
"innovative team approach") has two drawbacks. First, the grouping together of all 
available forces into a single entity narrows the range of alternative paths of 
development that are explored and could also cartelize the industry. Second, the 
institutional concentration makes it difficult to stop the project if it fails. According to 
Cohen et ul. "the innovative team approach makes the program more difficult to kill if 
NASP becomes nothing more than an expensive toy". In short, this organizational form 
not only increases the risk of missing the best design, it also raises the cost of a possible 
failure. This leads to reduced resource-allocation efficiency in the given research sector. 
Cohen et nl. suggest that this organizational form, more a reflection of political pressure 
rhan of technical and economic optimization, increases the likelihood of failure. 
What can we say in response to the above evaluation? The critique is, of course. 
r e l e ~ ~ n t :  a unified orsanizational form increases the risk of missing the best design. It 
also increases the cost of a possible failure regarding the selected evolutionary 
trajectory. Uncertainty about the performances and functionalities of a large number of 
possible "canditates" to be selected as the technological standard calls for incremental 
development, flexible management schedules, and the ability to explore many technical 
paths before commitment is made to a particular system design (Cohen, Edelman, and 
Noll, 1991, p.53). 
NASP does not fulfill that set of necessary organizational conditions. Currently, 
there are also several reasons why the formation of a single entity would be advisable. 
One of the reason is associated with the necessary production of a collective research 
infrastructure (standards, infratechnologies, instrumentalities). The production of this 
infrastructure, which enables measurement, comparison, and collective experimentation, 
must occur despite great uncertainty as to the potential returns from projects based on 
the infrastructural knowledge generated. Here we find a justification for "clubbing 
together", i.e. the formation of a single entity grouping together all agents in a particular 
sector and the rapid creation of irreversible organizational capital, with strong 
participation from public agencies in the production of infratechnologies and 
instrumentalities [9]. There is no doubt that there is a rationale behind NASP's 
organization. This rationale resolves the organizational conflict stemming from the 
tension between diversity and standardization. NASP therefore attaches greater 
importance to the production of a collective research infrastructure than to the broad 
exploration of the technological and functional spectrum. This orientation manifests 
itself as a preference for a unified organizational form -- the innovative team approach - 
- as opposed to the management of multiple decentralized experimentation and 
exploration projects. 
* * *  
We try here to investigate the manner in which it is possible to find a balance 
between these two organizational priorities. After successively examining what would be 
the economic rationale for both organizational forms in the case of NASP, we will 
rsplnre how to manage the tension between standardization and diversity in the 
organization of the program. 
2 - Uncertainty about the technological infrastructure and the necessity for 
organizational standardization 
The accomplishment of the program's mission necessarily implies a change in the 
technological base [lo]. Such a radical change creates a situation of structural 
uncertainty [ l l ]  which in turn implies a need for knowledge acquisition on the very 
structure (data, methods, instruments) of the problems considered . This in turn directs 
the program toward the production of infratechnologies and research instruments. As a 
result, the appropriate organizational form should be subject to the requirements of 
collective production of infratechnologies and instrumentalities. 
2-1) Presumptive anomaly as the engine of paradigmatic change 
Applying Constant's (1973) idea of, "a presumptive anomaly" underlies 
paradigmatic change, which in this case arises from the scientific evidence that 
conventional aerobic propulsion systems cannot function at hypersonic speeds. The 
presumptive anomaly joins the functional anomaly as a factor of paradigmatic change. 
However, in contrast to the latter, the presumptive anomaly is deduced from science 
before a new paradigm has been formulated, so that scientific deduction is the sole 
reason for creating the new paradigm as it is the only guide. There is no functional 
failure; one presumes the existence of an anomaly, hence the term, presumptive 
anomaly. 
Such a paradigmatic change implies discontinuities, scientific as well as 
technological. The two traditiomal supports for the elaboration of new technological 
concepts (scientific models and designs of preceding technological generations -- the 
supersonic "ramjet") cannot be used well here, and only permit certain highly limited 
indications. 
In the following paragraphs, we show that, in the case of hypersonic technologies, 
the state-of-the-art does not yet permit the development of predictive models. 
Furthermore, old concepts (especially the "ramjet") only supply very limited indications 
and therefore do not compensate for the absence of predictive models. 
2-2) The weakness of available scientific evidence 
In the case of supersonic combustion (Mach 5-6), the first difficulty is that it is 
almost impossible to produce on-the-ground scientific data that is needed in order to 
validate the "scramjet" concept and predict its performance. Indeed, on-the-ground test 
capacities and experimental installations do not yet exist for vessels beyond Mach 8. 
There are no installations capable of reproducing the combination of speeds, pressures. 
and temperatures necessary to simulate hypersonic flight. Experiments on the ground 
are extremely short. For example, the hypersonic wind tests generally last less than a few 
seconds because of the great quantities of energy required. There is a clear lack of 
suitably sized installations needed for the experimental verification of propulsion and 
aerodynamics concepts beyond Mach 8 (US Space GAO, 1988). This weakness in 
experimental apparatus is partially overcome by mathematical simulation methods. 
Here, however, there are also immense difficulties. The resolution of supersonic 
combustion equations would require nearly unlimited calculation times. The simulations 
therefore comprise significant approximations. Another crucial problem is the absence 
of a predictive law for turbulence. 
Finally, we must remember that simulations do not eliminate the need for real 
tests. which are still required in order to verify the results. Calculations may nonetheless 
minimize the quantity of experimental work necessary. They enable researchers, for 
example, to limit wind-tunnel tests to those precise areas where simulations are too 
difficult or do not provide sufficiently precise results. 
I n  the final analysis. tlie current difficulty of ensuring synergy between 
calculations and real tests reveals that science is still far from being able to provide 
predictive models for innovation and analytical design. This weakness is not overcome 
by the existence of other sources of information, such as concepts inherited from 
preceding technological generations. 
2-3) The weakness of lessons from old concepts 
The paradigmatic change described above is reflected in the fact that the results 
obtained at the threshold of Mach 5 are no longer valid beyond Mach 5. Certain 
physical-chemical laws are even reversed once one passes from the supersonic domain 
to the hypersonic [12]. It is useful here to use the terminology established by David. 
Mowery, and Steinmueller (1992) to assess the potential of transferability of knowledge 
generated by a basic research program. 
L 
First, the "homotopic correspondences" [13] between the concepts developed at 
different levels of speed are weak. There is therefore a definite discontinuity between 
the supersonic and the hypersonic domains which precludes an evolution based on 
modest additional investments in installations and human resources. 
Second, the "analogical links" between aerobic propulsion and rocket propulsion 
are relatively insignificant [14]. They only allow for a slightchance of transferring 
knowledge from one domain to the other [15]. 
Finally, with respect to the weakness in homotopic correspondences and 
analogical links, this research domain will have a relatively high degree of "lumpiness", 
as much on the material plane as on the informational one. This will greatly affect 
expected economic returns [ 161. 
2-4) First priority: the production of infratechnologies 
The change in the technological base therefore creates a situation of structural 
uncertaint!. \i8hich in turn implies a need for information on the very structure of the 
problems considered. A chanze in the technological base thus means that a critical lack 
in "infratechnologies" [17] and "instrumentalities" [18] has to be overcome. In other 
words, the instrumental basis for R&D within the new paradigm is completely lacking: 
"lots of things need to be measured that we do not know how to measure" (De Mice, 
1990). 
Analysis of the content of research carried out enables us to define the 
hypersonic programs as "oriented toward the production of adequate infratechnologies 
and instrumentalities" [ 191. This research phase precedes basic and applied research 
and contains a strong technological dimension: 
"The important thing about these techniques of science is that they are not of 
themselves part of the knowledge system of science. They are clearly technology. 
an understanding of the way to do things, and often in their beginning, as with the 
telescope or the voltaPc pile, no one properly understands how and why they do 
work as they do, but only that they work" (De Solla Price, 1984). 
It is clear that the NASP program is now in this preliminary phase, with its strong 
technological composition. How then does one produce infratechnologies and 
instrumentalities appropriate to the new technological base, given the weakness of 
scientific support. and the discontinuity marking the passage from the supersonic to the 
hypersonic domain'? The first objective is to push back the frontier of experimentation 
on the ground [19]. Second, i t  is necessary to develop a computer simulation for fluid 
dynamics to predict the performance and flight characteristics at speeds beyond ground- 
experimentation capacities. However, performances thus calculated can vary greatly 
according to the hypotheses expressed in the codes. Thus the first task is the verification 
of vehicle design methods using the correlation between simulation and 
experimentation. As a result. the NASP engine (the experimental vehicle X-30) will not 
(yet) be 3 prototype or 3 "R&D instrument". Instead, this will merely be a demonstration 
vehicle or "basic research instrument" enabling the production of infratechnologies and 
instrumentalities necessary for further research and development. 
No possibility for incremental research and step-by-step approaches exist: the 
\veaknris uf homotopic correspondences and analogical links reveal lumpy technological 
and research projects. The production of infratechnologies and instrumentalities is 
based on the experimentation-simulation relationship and should result in the design of 
demonstration vehicles for the production of flight data. It is only on the basis of such 
data that the subsequent research and development phases can be undertaken with a 
minimum of acceptable efficiency in resource allocation. 
2-5) Production of infratechnologies and the need for an unique organizational entity 
The production of structural information requires the elaboration of necessary 
infratechnologies and instrumentation. Certain specific organizational forms are the 
result. It is clear that an "infratechnologies-focused" program should be equipped with a 
particular organizational form, linked to the very nature of the element produced: 
infratechnologies constitute the basic standards which enable measurement, 
comparison, and collective research. They therefore represent the positive demand side 
for economies of scale. That is, they have no significance outside of collective usage 
(Kindleberger, 1984). Their generalized diffusion and adoption constitute their very 
mode of existence. In other words, infratechnologies possess some public good features: 
"Just as individual proprietary transportation vehicles utilize the same non 
proprietary highway, individual proprietary and processes utilize the same pool of 
basic research and the same pool of nonproprietary measurement or test methods. 
( .  .) Just as the highway is part of the economy's infrastructure. the measurement 
method or the verified database is part of the economy's infratechnology -- a public 
good provided by a government laboratory" (Tassey, 1991, p. 164). 
The public good (or at least the collective good) aspect of infratechnology 
implies the necessity to form a single "learning entity" to produce the necessary 
structural knowledge. Thus, the program must follow an organizational rationale 
requiring the formation of a technological club, which incorporates private and public 
expertise previously isolated and dispersed - in order to develop the technological 
infrastructure. 
3 - Uncertainty about the best design and the necessity for organizational diversity 
The NASP program considered above will now be reexamined to demonstrate 
that structural uncertainty also concerns the services and functions that the hypersonic 
and trans-atmospheric technologies are likely to assume in the future. This uncertainty 
about functions makes it necessary to investigate what could be the best design and how 
one should use it? [21]. A phase of exploration and experimentation covering the full 
functional and technological spectrum must therefore be undertaken before selection of 
a particular set of performance criteria and the attendant unique trajectory are made. 
3-1) Uncertainty about functions and performances 
In the case of the hypersonic program, the objective discussed above lies beyond 
the limits of those performance criteria that have hitherto governed the technological 
evolution of aerospace engines (Nakinenovic, 1987, Gruebler, 1990). During the 
developn~ent of spatial technologies, criteria associated with cost and industrial 
implementation have gradually become evident and, in the case of rocket engines, have 
marked the end of a "stable" orientation for technological progress. This orientation - 
the so called "standard operating procedures to generate technological change" - is 
derived from the need to deal primarily with the problems of acceleration, speed, and 
orbital access, thereby ignoring the issues of reutilization. operability, and payload mass. 
The orientation thus neglected the industrial potential of aerospace transport systems 
(Brooks, 1983; Macauley , 1986). 
The new research objective is to try to reconcile the contradictory performance 
requirements that were previously applied exclusively, either to aeronautic or to space 
projects. This involves uniting in a single engine, the economic advantages of airplane 
engines (cost. ratio to mass, operability. maintenance) with the performance criteria of 
rockets. in terms of flight speed and orbital access. 
3-2) Option generation and the necessity of organizational diversity 
A change in technological orientation implies a structural uncertainty with 
respect to the design and utilization of the new product. Thus, there is no consensus 
today on the best design for a space engine equipped with a supersonic combustion 
ramjet. Moreover, it is not yet known whether the missile, the launcher or the plane will 
represent the best application of the scramjet. The construction of a functioning pre- 
identified engine is therefore not at issue. 
This structural uncertainty as to the best design and utilization implies a certain 
organizational diversity. This diversity facilitates experimentation in different directions 
and option generation. According to Ergas (1994), option generation refers to the 
process by which alternative design approaches are developed, tested, and selected. As a 
learning process, the efficiency of option generation can be greatly affected by the range 
of alternatives being explored and by the speed and integrity with which the results of 
exploratory efforts are transmitted within the technological community involved. In 
other words, one should create a system involving multiple, decentralized projects, being 
the only way to explore the totality of the technological and functional spectrum. Such a 
system must include also mechanisms and procedures for exchanging and distributing 
information produced in the course of these projects, and a centralized procedure of 
assessment to decide upon the timing of the switch and the standard to be selected. The 
final orientation of the entire program toward a single, predetermined area should only 
be decided after the completion of many pilot projects and broad experimentation [22]. 
Such an organizational design is, however, rather difficult to establish. First, it  is 
necessary to plan some financial compensation for those projects not selected (selection 
ultimately results in technological orphans). Second, the information generated by the 
different experiments must be shared. Only when this is the case does the experience of 
one agent reduce the uncertainties of other agents, and play a part in cross-fertilization. 
But if i t  is known that such information is to be widely shared, there will be an incentive 
for agents to free-ride. thus avoiding the cost of participating in any of the experiments. 
4 - Managing the organizational tension between diversity and standardization and 
creating common pools of knowledge 
Langlois' (1984) typology, which distinguishes parametric and structural 
uncertainty, enables us to catagorize NASP as research characterized by a double 
structural uncertainty relating to infratechnologies and research instrumentation (how 
does one carry out this research?) as well as to the best design and mode of utilization of 
the outcome (what does one do with this research?). From an organizational point of 
view, this means that a compromise has to be found between standardization and 
diversity, i.e., between the necessity to form a club, in order to produce the collective 
infrastructure for research (data. experimental procedures) and the need to diversify 
organizations in order to reduce the risk of bypassing the best design or utilization. How 
can this conflict of organizational objectives be dealt with within the NASP framework'? 
One could suggest that it is a matter of timing: after a period of experimentation, 
during which many variants of a technology are tried (organizationrrl diversity), one 
variant is selected as the standard (organizational unity). According to Cowan and 
Foray, 1993 and 1995). such a timing is based on the existence of two kinds of learning: 
the first is extensive learning or learning from diversity, which involves experimentation 
with a wide variety of options and, through the results of the experiments, leads to the 
elimination of certain avenues of development. The second type of learning can be 
called intensive learning, or learning from standardization, which concentrates attention 
on one technological variant. making it easier to identify empirical irregularities that 
point to underlying structural conditions deserving further investigation (See Cowan and 
Foray, 1995). 
We argued, however, that the phase of production of infratechnologies and 
instrurnenta1itit.s. i.e.. the production of the standards, precedes basic and applied 
research. In other words, some standardization work precede (or at least run in parallel 
with) the experiments. 
The difficulty is to build simultaneously infrastructural knowledge of two types: 
the first type deals with the production of infratechnologies and instruments associated 
to the change of paradigm. To be infrastructural, this type of knowledge must be 
collectively used and, thus, has to be public and diffused in well-documented forms. The 
second type deals with the information generated by the different experiments. To be 
infrastructural, this second type of knowledge must be shared in being incompletely 
appropriable and persistent [23]. 
Thus, the coexistence of the following features -- the expansion of measurement, 
standards, and testing activities of public institutions on the one hand, and the design of 
organizations involving multiple, decentralized, high-tech consortia on the other hand -- 
might be an unique way to manage the tension between diversity and standardization in 
the organization of the research program [24]. 
Notes 
1 The expression "discovery in the context of application" was suggested by Prof. Michael Gibbons, who used 
it to characterize the organization of the innovation process in the case of hypersonic aircraft. An excellent 
summary of the case is provided in Chapter 1 of the book The New Producrion of Knowledge (Gibbons et al . ,  
1994). 
2 In another paper in this series, Thomas Schelling (1995) describes and analyses another class of 
discovery that he termed "research by accident": a sequence of unanticipated discoveries which subsequently 
reveal properties and characteristics of the technology not expected initially. 
3 Some pioneer, althoug recent, contributions from Cohen and Noll (1991 and 1992) deal with the issue of 
assessing the organizational forms of big federal projects. 
4 The aerobic principle is distinguished by the utilization of oxygen from air (taken up from the atmosphere) 
as the combustive agent, whereas rocket propulsion requires the loading of both fuel and combustive agents 
(anaerobic principle). 
5 Hypersonic speed is obtained from supersonic combustion, just as supersonic speed is obtained from 
subsonic combustion. 
6 The members of the club are McDonnel Douglas, General Dynamics, Rockwell, Pratt & Whitney, and 
Rocketdyne. The National Program Office assumes the function of program coordinator. 
7 "The team has already developed an unclassified network to develop scheduling and other plans, and it is 
now working on a classified system to handle electronic transfer of drawings and other data" (Wright- 
Patterson, 1990a). 
8 "But mainlining brings the government-run facilities into positions often played by contract research labs 
or subcontractors" (Wright-Patterson, 1990a). 
9 For example, government efforts led by NASA-Ames have provided an understanding of how to safely 
contain hydrogen, especially during the NASP's high-temperature flight (Wright-Patterson, 1990b) 
10 The notion of technological base is used in a narrow sense. It includes the products and processes of 
production, as well as the ideas, concepts, and modes of enquiry that are necessary to generate a particular 
revealed performance (Layton. 1974). 
11 Uncertainty can be either parametric or structural. Parametric uncertainty means that the structure of 
the problem is clear and the uncertainty only affects certain specific parameters (the chances of various 
outcomes). Structural uncertainty concerns the very structure of the problem (what outcomes are possible) 
(Langlois, 1984, p.29). 
12 Beyond Mach 5, air no longer behaves as a perfect gas; beyond Mach 8 ,  properties dependent upon 
temperature and even dissociation become dominant (Barthelemy, 1989): "as a result of kinetic chemical 
phenomena of increasing significance, simple extrapolation parameters no longer exist which can be applied 
to the domain of supersonic combustion". 
13 See David. hlowery, and Steinmueller (1992): the methods and results may or may not be extrapolated to 
e\.ery size of range. The notion of "homotopic correspondence" comes from topology: two correspondences 
are s a ~ d  to be homotopic i f  one of them can be deformed continually within the other. Thus, in mechanics, a 
theory predicting the reaction of a physical object to attraction by an external force will be true for any 
object of greater mass. The relationship between force and mass is unaffected by changes in the mass 
parameter. 
14 See David, Mowery, and Steinmueller (1992): the analogical links are important because nature is 
conservative in its usage of concepts and structures. The concept of symmetry, applied in mathematics and 
physics, as well as chemistry and crystallography, is a good example of an analogical link allowing for the 
extension of theoretical results from one domain to another. 
15 "The installation requirements for aerodynamic experimentation and propulsion systems appear to be 
quite different depending upon whether they concern the development of a shuttle or a scramjet 
demonstrator" (Harsha and Aldman, 1989). 
16 See David, Mowery, and Steinmueller (1992): the property of "lumpiness" is derived from the fact that the 
production of new results requires the prior resolution of a greater or lesser number of subproblems in the 
research area. This lumpiness may be either informational (the minimum of subproblems to solve) or 
material (the minimum of required experimental installations). This property is no doubt particularly 
pronounced where the homotopic correspondznces are weak. 
17 Following Tassey (1991), we will define infratechnologies as the instrumental basis of R&D, including: 
"the scientific data necessary for operations of measurement, test, control, and trial; methods and research 
instruments, techniques, and knowledge. Infratechnologies are the bases of technological development in 
that they enable precise measurements and furnish scientific and technical data, evaluated and organized, 
necessary to the understanding, characterization, and interpretation of pertinent research results. 
Infratechnologies are linked to the basic units of measure. In addition, infratechnologies incorporate the 
concepts and techniques of measurement and testing which allow for increased quality". 
18 According to Derek de Solla Price (1984, p.13). instrumentality carries "the general connotation of a 
laboratory method for doing something to nature or to the data in hand". 
19 Thus, according to Rosenberg (1992): "Scientific instruments may be usefully regarded as the capital 
goods of the scientific research industry. That is to say, the conduct of scientific research generally requires 
some antecedent investment in specific equipment for purposes of enhancing the ability to observe and 
measure specific categories of natural phenomena". 
20 After determining that existing Air Force, NASA, industry and university engine test facilities were not 
capable of testing scram.iets above speeds o f  Mach 8 for sustained periods, the NASP program awarded two 
contracts in October 1986 totaling US $9.6 million for two engine test facilities. These facilities are expected 
to provide the capability to test full-scale scramjets up to speeds of Mach 8 (GAO, 1988). 
2 1  The existence of what Humrnon (1984) termed as "the standard operating procedures to generate 
rechnological change", may result in a reduction of this kind of uncertainty. These standard operating 
procedures constitute a structure of mutually consistant expectations on the rate and direction of innovation, 
which in turn facilitates industrial coordination. 
22 According to David and Rothwell (l990), Cohen and Noll (1991, p.42), and Cowan and Foray (1993 and 
1995). 
23 Knowledge that plays an infrastructural role in industry needs to persist long enough that i t  can be 
recognized and exploiled by the organizations not directly involved in its creation (see Steinmueller, 1995). 
2 1  In this area. the work of D.Collingridge (1990) on the establishment of a principle of incrementalism in 
[he management o f  large research programs very likely indicates the way for additional fruitful research. 
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